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In May of 1993, Kim Basinger, who starred in such movies as L.A. Confidenial,
Batman, and Nine 2 Weeks, filed for bankruptcy after a jury ordered her to pay an
$8.9 million judgment.' After Basinger failed to appear in the film Boxing Helena,
Main Line Productions successfully sued the actress for breach of oral contract.'
After initially filing a Chapter 11, Basinger's attorneys converted the case to a
Chapter 73 According to Leslie Cohen, Basinger's attorney, the conversion was
necessitated by Main Line's unreasonable demands, which included appointment
of a third party to exercise control over whether or not Basinger should accept
particular acting roles and forced disclosure of any plans Basinger had to have a
baby.4 Cohen claimed the demands infringed upon Basinger's constitutional
rights and amounted to involuntary servitude.' According to Cohen Main Line
argued that the actress's possible pregnancy would affect her ability to work and
thus her ability to pay off her debts: a legitimate concern of her creditors.6 Could
a creditor use the bankruptcy system to control a debtor's ability to work and
even begin a family? If so, who owned Kim Basinger?
I. INTRODUCTION

Unlike other forms of intellectual property such as copyrights and patents, the
right to exclusive use of one's persona is a relatively new property right in
American jurisprudence. Whereas other forms of intellectual property rights have
their origin in English statutes,7 the recognition of a celebrity's right to the
exclusive control and privilege of publishing his or her picture is barely fifty years
old.' Unfortunately, legislatures have been slow to codify the right of publicity
leaving courts to wade the murky waters of the common law with little or no
statutory guidance. Since persona rights were first introduced in the Haelan
decision, courts have attempted to further define the exact contours of this
property right. Court discussions of persona rights range from analysis of its

' Judy Brennan, Is She the Villn-or a Victim?, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1994, at Calendar 6. The
dispute arose out of Basinger's refusal to star in the movie Boxing Hekna. Id
2 id
4 Id
Id
6 Robert W. Welkos, KmBaingerSeeksFuiherBankruptyProtection: CreditorsSaActress is T ying
to Insulate Recent Earnings,L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1993, at D4.
' See Statute of Monopolies of 1624, 21 Jac. I, c.3 (Eng.) (granting exclusive rights to "letters
patent . . . for a term of 14 years . . . of the sole working or making of any manner of new
manufactures within this realm"); Statute of Anne of 1710, 8 Ann. c. 19, § 1 (Eng.) (granting authors
monopolies on their books for fourteen years).
8 See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953)
(construing New York law).
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origins in the right to privacy to whether the property descends to the decedent's
heirs upon death.9
While certain areas of persona rights have received extensive coverage and
academic treatment, one facet that -remains largely unexplored is the place of
publicity rights in the American bankruptcy system. Because the right of publicity
is classified as a property right, it seems intuitive that it would become part of the
bankruptcy estate, subject to seizure and liquidation to a third party. Many
scholars have suggested such an approach as the list of famous people who file
bankruptcy grows.' Although this approach initially has an orderly appeal, one
must answer several questions before reaching such a conclusion. Is the right to
publicity strictly a property right that is subject to seizure and liquidation by
creditors of celebrities and public figures? If so, what exactly would the
successful bidder on this property acquire? Does state law provide any grounds
to exempt such property from the bankruptcy estate?
The purpose of this Note is to answer these questions and argue that contrary
to the suggestion of case law, the right of publicity as "property" has not
completely abandoned its foundational ties to the right of privacy. Furthermore,
the complex nature of publicity rights, coupled with the policies and statutory
rules of the Bankruptcy Code, prevents such a treatment. While only one state
explicitly exempts the right to publicity from the bankruptcy estate," this Note
suggests state law should find a place in its respective exemption statutes to
protect the personal dignity and future earning capacity of the insolvent celebrity.

II. BACKGROUND

12

A. UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY LAW

1. Chapter7 and Chapter 13. The Constitution of the United States empowers
the federal government "[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of

Bankruptcies throughout the United States."' 3 Since 1898, a federal bankruptcy

9 See, e.g., State ex reL Elvis Presley Int'l Mem'l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97-99, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1663, 1668-70 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
10 See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby & Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Foreclosingon Fame: Exploring the
UnchartedBoundaries of the Right of Pubdy, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1322, 1323-26 (2002).
,' 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1075/15 (West 2001).
12Title 11 of the U.S. Code was amended in April 2005. Pub. L. No. 109-8 § 306(b), 119 Stat.
80 (2005). This Note was written prior to the amendments and reflects the law prior to the April
2005 changes.
13U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
4.
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law has permanently been in effect. 4 Today, bankruptcy cases are governed by
Title 11 of the United States Code.'
When an insolvent debtor seeks bankruptcy protection, the filing of the
bankruptcy petition imposes a stay that prevents creditors from pursuing any
activity toward the collection of a debt. 6 Along with the petition, the debtor is
required to file "a list of creditors,... a schedule of assets and liabilities, current
income and current expenditures, and a statement of the debtor's financial
affairs."'" The trustee and creditors use these schedules to establish what
property is part of the estate, the status of a creditor's claim (either secured,
priority or unsecured), and which debts will be discharged at the end of the
bankruptcy. 8 All debts that remain unpaid at the conclusion of the cases are
discharged, thus relieving the debtor of all debts and obligations that arose prepetition with certain notable exceptions. 9
In a typical consumer bankruptcy case, a debtor selects between a liquidation
bankruptcy governed by Chapter 7 or a Chapter 13 rehabilitation case. In a
chapter 7 liquidation case, the debtor's existing assets are placed under the control
of the trustee, an officer appointed by the United States Trustee's Office to
administer the bankruptcy estate.2" Upon taking control of the estate, the trustee
is charged with liquidating assets of the estate and distributing the proceeds to
creditors according to 11 U.S.C. § 726.21 After the estate is administered, the
remaining debts are discharged unless reaffirmed or redeemed pursuant to Title
11.22

An alternative to the liquidation of assets under Chapter 7 is Chapter 13's
repayment plan. Unlike chapter 7, the debtor in a Chapter 13 case is able to retain
possession of property and possesses all rights that the trustee would have under

4 CHARLES JORDON TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRuPTCY 32-36 (The Found. Press, Inc. 1997)
(noting the original Bankruptcy Acts were short-lived and the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the first
permanent piece of bankruptcy legislation). The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was amended several times
and eventually repealed by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Id.
II See 11 U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
16 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000). Subsection b of this provision does recognize certain exceptions to
the bankruptcy stay, including alimony and support payments as well as criminal prosecutions. Id.
17 Id. § 521(1).
IS See id § 523(a)(3) (stating that a discharge under § 727 does not include debts not listed in the
schedules).
19 See id

§

727. Most notably, subsection (a)(2) prevents the granting of a discharge if "the

debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate charged with the
custody of property... has transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed" property. Id.
20 See id. §§ 701-702, 704.
21 See id §§ 704, 726.
2 Id. §§ 524(c), 722.
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Chapter 7.23 In a Chapter 13, debtors, in addition to a petition and schedules,
must file a plan outlining their ability to contribute all disposable income to the
repayment of creditors for a period of up to thirty-six months.24 Secured
creditors are usually paid the value of the collateral securing the claim, with the
balance paid as unsecured debt, typically cents on the dollar.25 Assuming a
creditor or the trustee does not successfully object to the proposed plan,26 the
debtor's plan will be confirmed and the debtor will be obligated to tender plan
payments to the trustee for distribution to creditors.27 At the conclusion of the
confirmed plan and after all plan payments have been made, the remaining debt
will be discharged.28
2. Properl of the Estate and Exemptions. While the systems of Chapter 7 and
Chapter 13 differ greatly, important threshold issues are the same; namely what
property is included in the bankruptcy estate and to which exemptions, if any, the
debtor is entitled under applicable law. Once the petition is filed, an "estate" is
established by the operation of law. 29 The estate includes "all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." 3 In
analyzing this provision, courts have repeatedly found that intellectual property
rights are legal and equitable interests in property and therefore property of the
bankruptcy estate.31 While this might lead to an assumption that publicity rights
should also fit neatly into the bankruptcy estate, 5 521 contains one very
important exception that precludes such an immediate conclusion.
The law exempts "earnings from services performed by an individual debtor
after the commencement of the case" from the bankruptcy estate.32 This

- Id. 1303, 1306(b).
24 Id
1321-1322, 1325(b)(1)(B).
25TABB, supra note 14, at 555-57 (noting 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) excepts from "lien stripping"
debts secured by mortgages in the debtor's primary residence).
26 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). Under this provision, creditors may object to the confirmation of the
plan if the plan was not proposed in good faith, if the plan is not feasible given the debtor's income
and expenses, or if the plan fails to treat them appropriately. Id
2 See id § 1326(a)(2). Under chapter 13, the trustee's primary duties are to serve as the
disbursing agent for plan payments and monitor the debtor's ongoing payment efforts. See TABB,
supra note 14, at 82.
28 11

U.S.C.§ 1328(a).

29Id.§ 541 (a).
30Id 541(a)(1).

31See, e.g., In reDillon, 219 B.R. 781, 784 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1998) (holding royalty rights are
rights which accrue post-petition and thus property of the estate); Johanna Farms, Inc. v. Citrus
Bowl, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 866, 874,199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 16,22 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); In reGucci, 202 B.R.
686 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding trademarks and corporate goodwill are vested in the bankruptcy
estate); United States v. Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d 1467, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating intellectual
property in general, including patents, copyrights, and trademarks, are part of a bankruptcy estate).
32 See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(6).
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exception implicitly recognizes that bankruptcy is a vehicle for a fresh start, and
3
the product of post-petition human capital lies at the very core of that notion.D
Were a debtor's post-petition labor subject to seizure and sale, the debtor would
remain enslaved by the burden of a prior debt.
Once the property of the estate is determined, the debtor can claim the
property as exempt. Both state and federal law contain exemption statutes, which
list various pieces of property a debtor can exclude from the bankruptcy estate.'
These statutory exemptions further preserve certain pieces of property from
liquidation to insure a debtor emerges from bankruptcy with some assets to
enable a fresh start.35 It is important to note that each state's exemption statute
differs in some degree and reflects policy judgments about what a debtor needs
for a successful "fresh start. '36 If property is labeled as exempt, the debtor will
usually be able to retain the property or receive the value of the exemption upon
liquidation. In both situations, the debtor can emerge from bankruptcy with
some assets and attempt to start over.
3. Polig Considerations. The policies underlying United States bankruptcy law
represent a balancing between the interests of the two parties involved in the
dispute: the debtor burdened under the weight of insurmountable debt and
creditors seeking to maximize the return on their investment. Any review and
critical analysis of the bankruptcy law must not forget these two important
principles as they are the driving force of the entire system.
From the debtor's perspective, bankruptcy affords an opportunity to remove
37
certain debts while retaining enough assets to begin with a fresh start. An
important component in this fresh start is the right to keep the profits from
future, post-petition labor. If bankruptcy law required the debtor to involuntarily
forfeit such profits, the debtor would have less incentive to work.3" As Tabb
argues, the lack of productive debtors following discharge would result in "a
perpetual debtor underclass."39

33 TABB, supra note 14, at 285.
34 See, e.g., 10 DEL. CODEANN. tit. 10 § 4914 (2005); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. % 441.001,42.001,

42.002 (Vernon 2004). See 11 U.S.C. § 522.
35 ELIZABETH WARREN &JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 207
(4th ed., Aspen Publishers 2004).
3 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a)(1); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 222.01 (West 2004). The Florida
homestead exemptions grant an unlimited exemption to secure the debtor's homestead. Warren and
Westbrook explain homestead exemptions as premised on the nature of home ownership as the only
hold on a middle-class lifestyle. See WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 35, at 123.
37 TABB, supra note 14, at 3 (noting that the fresh start includes both the discharge of debts and
the retention of some current property).
38 Id.
39 I
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However, the creditors must not be forgotten. The bankruptcy court is
required to protect the creditors' interests and facilitate efficient distribution of
the estate.' After all, debtors should not be able to abuse the system and avoid
their obligations. Various sections of the Code guard against such abuse.4 The
American bankruptcy system maintains the goal of carefully balancing competing
interests, and discussions of the topic must be mindful that both interests deserve
consideration.
4. Recent Trends and Celebrity Fi'ngs. Until recently, bankruptcy courts
witnessed a gradual increase in the number of cases filed annually.42 Between
1999 and 2003, the total number of bankruptcy filings in the United States
jumped from 1.39 million to just over 1.66 million.43 Chapter 7 cases constituted
the largest area of growth, increasing by almost 300,000 filings between 2000 and
2003." While the current figures show the number of bankruptcies has declined,
in the previous year more than 1.1 million individuals still filed for bankruptcy
protection between September 30, 2003 and September 30, 2004.
Moreover, famous celebrities and public figures are not immune from the
slings and arrows of insolvency. The list of celebrities who have filed bankruptcy
is not only long, but also surprising given the commercial success of those
celebrities. Included in the list are Burt Reynolds, Kim Basinger, Toni Braxton,
Francis Ford Coppola,' Mike Tyson,47 and Don Johnson.' In most of these
cases, the debtor's persona rights were never at issue. However, as the Kim
Basinger example proves, the celebrity's exclusive right to control his or her
public image and ability to work, the very essence of persona rights, may become
49
the central issue in controversy.
It is important to note that Chapter 7 bankruptcies constitute the majority of
bankruptcy filings and are two and a half times more frequent than Chapter 13

0 Id "[tihe core function of bankruptcy law is as a collective creditors' remedy that furthers the
goals of efficiency and of distributive justice." Id
41 See supra notes 19, 26.
42 Press Release, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Number of Bankruptcy Cases Filed
in Federal Courts Down Less Than One Percent (Aug. 27, 2004), availableat http://www.uscourts.
gov/PressReleases/june04bk.pdf.
43 Id

44id
45 News Release from Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Bankruptcy Filings Down in
Fiscal Year 2004 (Dec. 3, 2004), at http://www.uscourts.gov/Press-Releases/fy04bk.pdf.
46Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 10, at 1325 (providing a more exhaustive list of filings
before 2002).
47 Tson Plans to Continue Boxing in Efforts to Pay off $38 Milon of Debt,JET MAG., July 19, 2004,
at 51.
4' Miami,Mongy andMeltdown, GUARDIAN (London), May 17, 2004, at Features 6.
49 See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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cases.5" Since these two approaches to bankruptcy differ so significantly,
attempting to cover both in this Note would not do justice to the intricacies and
policy decisions surrounding both chapters. In this Note, Chapter 7 will govern
since Chapter 7 cases are both more common, and the administration and
liquidation of assets provide the best example of the pitfalls of treating the right
to publicity as an asset of the bankruptcy estate. Nevertheless, the analysis that
follows is largely applicable to Chapter 13 cases as well and, where appropriate,
such application will be noted.
B. THE RIGHT TO PUBLICITY

As stated above, the right to publicity is in a relative state of infancy with its
more subtle aspects still being explored.51 However, before one can appreciate
the finer points of the doctrine, one must understand the law's historical roots
and the progress of the law to this point. While this section does not purport to
be an exhaustive study of the right of publicity's historical tract, it provides
enough background so that recurring themes, arguments, and dilemmas of
publicity disputes may become more apparent.
1. The Haelan Decisionand Its Offspring. Courts agree that the right to publicity
developed as "a collateral outgrowth of the 'law of privacy.' ,,2 Most
commentators and courts consider the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision
of Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. to be the birth of an
independent right of publicity as separate and distinct from the right of privacy. 3
Ironically, the celebrity whose rights were allegedly violated was not a party to the
lawsuit.
In Haelan, the plaintiff and defendant were rival manufacturers of chewing
gum baseball cards.5 4 The baseball player in question had granted the plaintiff an
exclusive right to use his photograph on its cards."5 The defendant later obtained
authorization from the baseball player to use his picture on its products.5 6 The

s Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 45.
51 See supra text accompanying notes 8-9.
52 Current Audio, Inc. v. RCA Corp., 337 N.Y.S.2d 949, 954 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1972). See also
Martin Luther King,Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697,70002 (Ga. 1982) (stating the right of publicity is a "correlative" to the right of privacy) (quoting
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905)).
" RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46, reporters' note cmt. b (1995); see, e.g.,
Jacoby and Zimmerman, supranote 10, at 1329-30.
-4Haelen Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867 (2d Cit. 1953).
5sId
56Id
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subsequent publication resulted in litigation. 57 The defendant alleged that the
plaintiff's contract with the player was nothing more than a release from liability
for violation of privacy rights because the only interest the athlete had in the
publication of his picture was his right to privacy.58 Thus, the issue concerned
what rights or property the plaintiff obtained when the celebrity granted the
plaintiff the exclusive right to use his picture.
In rejecting the defendant's argument, the court noted that "in addition to and
independent of that right of privacy (which in New York derives from statute),
a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant
the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture... ."" The court's conclusion
rested on New York case law and rejected prior decisions focusing on the
interpretation and application of New York statutory law.6" According to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, New York law recognized a common law right
of publicity because "many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players),
far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses,
would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing
advertisements .. "61 The opinion characterizes publicity not as a dignitary
interest, but rather as a valuable asset.
While the Haelan decision laid the groundwork for the right of publicity as a
separate and independent doctrine from the right of privacy, the state courts of
New York did not follow Haelan's lead. In later cases where celebrities sued for
violation of privacy as well as violation of the right to publicity, courts were not
receptive to Haelan. Specifically, courts held the right of publicity was not one
separate and independent from the statutory right of privacy, but was rather part
of the same statutorily protected interest identified in sections 50 and 51 of the
New York Civil Rights Law.62 One commentator believed the Stepbano decision
"retied the conceptual knot between privacy and publicity. 6 3 While Halpem
probably overstates the import of the Stephano case it is important to note that

7 Id.

"

Id at 868.

59 Id.

60Id.at 868-69.

61 Id.at 868.
62 See Stephano v. News Group Publ'ns, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 584 (N.Y. 1984) (stating" 'the

right of publicity' is encompassed under the Civil Rights Law as an aspect of the right of privacy,
which, as noted, is exdusive4 statutoy in this State, the plaintiff cannot claim an independent commonlaw right of publicity" (emphasis added)); Brinkley v. Casablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004,1011-12 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1981).
63 Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Pubdy: CommercialExploitaion of the Assodative
Value of
Personakly, 39 VAND. L. REv. 1199, 1213 (1986).
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the right to publicity has struggled to break completely free of its historical
moorings as an offshoot of the right of privacy.
2. Hae/an's Subsequent Influence. While the state courts of New York were
hesitant to create a new body of law based on the right of publicity, many courts
seized on the reasoning of the Haelan decision and found the right of publicity
protected different interests from the right of privacy. 64 With the growing
number of circuits recognizing the right to publicity, it was not long before the
Supreme Court weighed in on the debate. After acknowledging a right to
publicity separate from the right of privacy, Justice White explained:
The differences between these two torts are important.... 'The
interest protected' in permitting recovery for placing the plaintiff in
a false light "is clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones
of mental distress as in defamation." By contrast, the State's
interest in permitting a "right of publicity" is in protecting the
proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage
such entertainment.65
Beyond the traditional debate between privacy and publicity, the court went one
step further and discussed the right to publicity in terms familiar to discussions
of intellectual property. The Court stated that the purpose of giving legal
protection to the right of publicity was to provide celebrities and entertainers with
incentives to create and develop their personas and create publicized and
recognizable works of entertainment.66 This decision and the dicta of the court
illustrates the transition in both the case law and academic literature from the right
of publicity as a subsection of the right of privacy to the right of publicity as a
subsection of intellectual property. 67
As courts began to speak of the right to publicity as a property right, litigation
began to address more focused questions, such as exactly how far the "property"
label extended.68 Several decisions addressed the question of whether the right
to publicity was descendible upon the celebrity's death. 69 Logic dictates that one

" See, e.g., Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481,108 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 187 (3d
Cit. 1956); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
65 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 741, 747

(1977) (citation and footnote omitted).
66 Id.
67 See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETrION 5

28:6 (4th ed. Supp. 2003).
' See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
69 See Martin Luther King,Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697,
703-06, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 711, 716-19 (Ga. 1982); State ex reL Elvis Presley Int'l Mem'l Found.
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cannot experience dignitary harm by unlicensed appropriation of his or her image
after death. However, if a celebrity's image is a valuable property right, and a
celebrity works hard in his or her lifetime to develop and market that property
right, it seems antithetical that property rights extinguish at death. Thus, several
courts have found the right to publicity is descendible upon death and becomes
part of a celebrity's probate estate.7" However, the debate over the inheritability
of a celebrity's publicity rights was only one facet of the judicial exploration into
the nature of publicity rights.
In a series of decisions decided in the late 1980s, the courts addressed whether
publicity rights could be considered marital property, subject to equitable division
if the marriage ended in divorce. In each of these cases, the courts held that, to
the extent the property interest in the spouse's celebrity persona was obtained or
increased during the marriage and the non-celebrity spouse had aided in the
development of the interest, the non-celebrity spouse was entitled to an equitable
distribution of the property right."' As these cases and the Haelan decision
illustrate, the right to publicity is not one permanently vested in the celebrity, but
can be alienated both after and during the celebrity's life by either licensing and
contractual negotiations or equitable forfeiture, as in the case of divorce
settlements.
3. Statutory Formulaions. While the foundations of both the right to privacy
and, more specifically, publicity rights are found in the common law, thirteen state
legislatures have passed legislation protecting a celebrity's right to the exclusive
exploitation of his or her name and likeness.72 While each statute includes a basic
6ore of commonly identified elements, each statute also has its own subtleties (a
reflection of the multiple themes that have permeated the case law during the
development of the right to publicity). A brief sampling of these statues is
instructive.
The Massachusetts statute is a simple and basic formulation of the typical
statute. Specifically, Massachusetts protects the celebrity's "name, portrait or
picture... used... for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade" unless
the user first obtains the written consent of the celebrity.73 The statute also gives

v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97-99, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1663, 1668-70 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
70 See MarinLuther King,Jr., Ctr.forSoc. Change, 296 S.E.2d at 703-06; Cmwell, 733 S.W.2d at 9799.
71 See Piscopo v. Piscopo, 555 A.2d 1190, 1192-93 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988); Elkus v.
Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901,903-04 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991); Golub v. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946,949-50

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988).
72 California, Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin all have statutory formulations of the right
to publicity. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46, Statutory Note (1995).
" MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 3A (West 2005).
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knowingly
plaintiffs the possibility of obtaining treble damages if the defendant
74
used the persona in a manner that is prohibited or unlawful.
The Massachusetts statute provides a middle ground or starting point for
comparing other states' approaches. Some states have allowed protection of a
celebrity's name or likeness after the celebrity is deceased.7 5 The California statute
covers additional expressions of persona including "a deceased personality's
name, voice, signature photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products,
merchandise, or goods."76 Still other statutes are more expansive than the
Massachusetts approach. Florida legislation protects "the name, portrait,
photograph, or other likeness of any natural person" 7 but makes a special
provision that "[t]he remedies provided for in this section shall be in addition to
and not in limitation of the remedies and rights of any person under the common
law against the invasion of her or his privacy."7 8 Other statutes do not explicitly
cover the right to publicity, but judicial interpretation has found that the statutory
protection of the right to privacy subsumes and includes the right to publicity. 9
While this review is only a cursory survey of various statutory language, the
purpose of this section is not to explain the nuances of the statutes' application,
but rather to highlight two constantly recurring themes and how these themes
explain subtle differences between each state's approach. Each statute and case
must address two foundational questions before applying the law to each factual
setting. The court must confront the constant tension between the right to
publicity's historical roots as a subsection of the right to privacy and the right as
a freestanding property right. Furthermore, the court or legislature must choose
what subject matter the property right protects (such as pictures, names, voice?),
and whose persona is protected (deceased or living celebrity?).
4. Conclusions. While still in its infancy, the right of publicity has provided a
rich area of debate for legal scholars and judges. Nevertheless, two recurring
themes and inquiries constantly appear in most articles and the majority of the
case law.
The first of those themes is the intellectual justification for the right to
publicity and its relationship with its parent doctrine: the right to privacy. Various
authors interpret the status of the law in different ways in this regard. On the one
hand, some claim, "courts have now come to recognize that the two rights are
clearly separable and rest on quite different legalpolicies."8 Still, other scholars do not

74

Id.

71 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN.

76Id. § 3344.1 (a)(1).

77 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(1)

78Id. § 540.08(6).

§ 47-25-1103 (2004); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (West 2004).

(West 2004).

79 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 67,

§ 28:6 and accompanying text.

8 Id. (emphasis added).
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regard the division between privacy and publicity as clear and regard
the right of
81
publicity as merely "a variety of the tort of invasion of privacy."
The bulk of contemporary case law considers publicity rights as a property
right rather than a privacy issue.82 This position makes intuitive sense considering
that some characteristics of the right to publicity lend themselves more toward a
classification of property.83 Yet to conclude that the right of publicity is
exclusively a proprietary interest would be overly simplistic and lack an
appreciation of the larger picture. Modern courts continue to use privacy as a
foundation for a publicity infringement suit.84 Thus, it is more intellectually
appropriate to see the right of publicity and the right of privacy not as mutually
exclusive, but rather as protecting different interests originating from the same
wrong. As the Supreme Court stated in Zacchini, violation of the right to privacy
and misappropriation of persona rights are two separate causes of action, which
protect different interests: the right of privacy protects a dignitary interest; the
right of publicity protects a commercial interest.8" Nevertheless, some states
explicitly allow a right of publicity claim to stand together with a common law
breach of privacy claim.86
A brief hypothetical illustrates this relationship. Suppose a photographer
obtained nude photographs of Kim Basinger and sold them to a publisher at a
considerable profit. Certainly, Basinger would experience a very personal,
dignitary harm resulting from the invasion of her privacy. At the same time,
Basinger's picture is a valuable commodity that is capable of commercial
exploitation. Thus, the misappropriation has robbed her of a valuable property
interest. The same action that gave rise to an infringement of the right to
publicity may also give rise to a cause of action for a violation of privacy. While
commentators and scholars may have been quick to signal the independence of
the right of publicity from its intellectual ancestor, it is conceptually more
appropriate to see these independent causes of action as protecting different legal
interests.
Once the right to publicity is recognized, scholars consider the extent of those
rights. Does the right allow celebrities to devise exclusive control of their

M 62a AM.JUR. 2D Pivay § 17 (2004); see alro
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652A (1977)
(classifying the violations of one's publicity as one of four types of privacy invasions).
82 See, e.g., Crowell, 733 S.W.2d at 97.
83 See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
84 Wendt v. Host Int'l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806,811,44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1189, 1192 (9th Cit. 1997)

("The protection of name and likeness from unwarranted intrusion or exploitation is the heart of the
law of privacy.") (quoting Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431 (Cal. 1979)).
85 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 741, 747
(1977) (citations omitted).
6 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08(6) (West 2002).
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personas to their heirs? Can creditors of the estate access those rights to satisfy
debts? As the following sections will illustrate, defining the scope of persona
rights with precision is difficult. While publicity rights in many situations fit
neatly into traditional frameworks for tangible property such as estate law, other
areas of the law, such as debtor-creditor law, pose unique problems to such easy
classifications. s7 For now, the inability of commentators and courts to define how
the property right would exist in the debtor-creditor system is a significant barrier
to its inclusion in the bankruptcy estate.
III. STATE V. FEDERAL BANKRuPTCY EXEMPTIONS
Before making a specific proposal for protecting a celebrity's persona rights
or addressing the intellectual justifications behind treating the right of publicity
as exempt under bankruptcy law, the optimal mechanism must be selected. As
mentioned above, both state and federal law include provisions exempting
property from the bankruptcy estate.88 Thus, a threshold issue is to decide
between either state or federal exemptions.
At first glance, federal legislation seems appropriate and preferable to provide
an exemption for publicity rights. Most forms of intellectual property receive
protection from federal legislation.89 Moreover, as the Haelan decision, the
subsequent reaction of various state courts,9" and the differences between
statutory embodiments9 demonstrate, each state's approach is slightly different
in both the extent of protection and legal reasoning for said protection. This
divergence has led some commentators to call for federal legislation protecting
the right of publicity.92 Commentators stressed the importance of the preemptive
nature of federal legislation and the need to create uniformity amongst the
states.93 While the need for uniformity is important and cannot be overstated,
bankruptcy and property exemptions provide unique forums that are not
conducive to federal preemption.
In federal bankruptcy, not all debtors have access to both federal and state
exemption statutes. This dilemma arose from a legislative compromise dating to

8'See Crowell,733 S.W.2d at 97-99 (discussing publicity rights in the estate law context).
See supra text accompanying notes 34-36.
g See, e.g., Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1225 (2002) (trademarks); 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2002)
(patents); 17 U.S.C. § 1-1332 (2002) (copyrights).
90See supra text Part I.B. 1.
91 See supra text Part I.B.3.
92 See, e.g., Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Casefora Kantian Right ofPubcity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383,
409-10 (1999); Richard S. Robinson, Preemption, the Right of Publiciy, and a New FederalStatute, 16
CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.J. 183, 201-02 (1998).
9'See Haemmerli, supranote 92, at 410; Robinson, sapra note 92, at 206.
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the passage of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978. 9' While a history of the exemption
dilemma is not necessary, the controversy centered on whether debtors in
bankruptcy would be entitled to a federally created exemption, state based
exemptions, or both. 95 According to the compromise position, debtors would be
allowed to choose between the state and federal exemptions outlined in 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d) unless the state where the debtor resides passed a law prohibiting the use
of the federal exemptions.96 As of 2004, thirty-nine states have taken advantage
of the opt-out provision leaving most debtors with access only to state
exemptions laws.97 This opt-out
provision rendered the federal exemptions dead
98
letter in much of the nation.
Because the overwhelming majority of states have selected to opt out of the
federal exemption scheme, a federal exemption for the right to publicity would
be essentially powerless. Thus, although the goals of uniformity are most
efficiently served by federal preemption, the only chance of attaining uniform
protection in the bankruptcy context would be for each state to adopt an
unlimited exemption for the right to publicity.
IV. THE PERSONHOOD JUSTIFICATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A. TRADITIONAL THOUGHT

Why is a celebrity allowed to claim a property interest in his or her name or
likeness? Before discussing persona rights, most commentators and casebook
authors begin with the theoretical justification of intellectual property.99 Indeed,
a philosophical discussion of the right to publicity is a Shibboleth for any
examination of the topic. 1' However, these intellectual discussions are more than
required introductory material. Rather, they serve important paradigm setting
goals that create the foundation for practical discussions and approaches. The
particular paradigm from which one views property is particularly important in
the right to publicity.

94 TABB, supra note 14, at 643.

95 Id.
96 Id. at 644.
9' WARREN & WESTBROOK, spra note 35, at 207.
98 TABB, spra note 14, at 644.
99 See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 1-19 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing the various philosophical perspectives that
have been offered to justify the creation and protection of intellectual property).
1ooSee, e.g., Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 10, at 1327-38; Michael Madow, Private Ownershb
of Public Image: PopularCulture and Pubiciy Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 178-215 (1993).
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Generally speaking, the most frequently adopted philosophical foundation for
intellectual property in the United States is that of incentive creation.'' A
condensed version of this argument begins with the premise that society benefits
from intellectual property through enjoyment of creative works and the
advancement of science.'0 2 In order to promote invention and creation of useful
works, the law must provide economic incentives in the form of property rights
03
for inventors to invest the time and resources into creating those works.
To many observers and judges, the incentives rationale applies with equal
force to the right to publicity. Madow notes, "[tihe right of publicity... induces
people to expend the time, effort, and resources necessary to develop talents and
produce works that ultimately benefit society as a whole."'" As ChiefJustice Bird
noted in her dissent in Lugosi v. UniversalPictures, "providing legal protection for
the economic value in one's identity against unauthorized commercial exploitation
creates a powerful incentive for expending time and resources to develop the
skills or achievements prerequisite to public recognition .... Their performances,
inventions and endeavors enrich our society.... "105 While some commentators
have used the incentive justification to support publicity rights, most scholars rely
on other theories to recognize and protect persona rights.
Traditionally, proponents and critics of the right of publicity have relied on the
Lockean labor theory to justify protection.' °6 Labor theory differs slightly from
the incentive-based rationale. Labor theory focuses on the actual labor performed
rather than the motivation for such labor.' °7 Lockean labor theory argues that
property is the natural product of a person's labor. 8 The labor that a person
expends on an object fuses with that object creating something that is
appropriately called the property of the laborer. 9
Since its early history, the right to publicity has been explained, justified, and
protected under the Lockean labor paradigm:

101 MERGES ET AL., supra note 99, at 10.
102

Id at 11.

103

Id.

104 Madow, supranote 100, at 206. "We give celebrities a legal entitlement to the economic value

of their identities ... because we thereby encourage socially valuable activities and achievements."

Id

10' Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 441 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting). See also

Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576-77, 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 741, 748-49
(1977).
106 Haemmerli, supra note 92, at 388.
107 id
108 Id.

109JOHN LOCKE,THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Bobbs-

Merrill (1952) (1690)). Locke states "this labor being the unquestionable property of the laborer, no
man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to .... " Id
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It is also unquestionably true that in most instances a person
achieves publicity values of substantial pecuniary worth only after
he has expended considerable time, effort, skill, and even money.
It would seem to be afirstprincipleofAnglo-Americanjurisprudence,an
axiom of the mostfundamental nature, that evey person is entitled to thefruit
of his labors unless there are important countervailing public policy
considerations. Yet, because of the inadequacy of traditional legal
theories ... persons who have long and laboriously nurtured the
fruit of publicity values may be deprived of them, unless judicial
recognition is given to what is here referred to as the right of
publicity .... 110

Moreover, courts also frequently adopt the Lockean labor theory as a justification
for protecting a celebrity's right to publicity."' While intellectual property such
as copyrights and patents are predominately the product of the incentive rationale,
most courts and scholars have based their understanding of the right to publicity
upon Locke's theory of property.
B. A FORGOTTEN PARADIGM: PRIVACY AND PERSONHOOD

As previously noted, the right to publicity has never completely broken free
from its conceptual and intellectual roots in the right to privacy." 2 Given this
foundation, the Lockean labor theory and incentives rationale both suffer a critical
shortcoming. While these two philosophies explain the economic motivations
and the economic loss a celebrity would experience, neither theory appropriately
incorporates the privacy interests each person has in his or her persona. 13 If the
right of publicity was merely a physical commodity without personal attachment,
then economic damages in an infringement suit would be sufficient.
In practice, however, courts have recognized that the damages to celebrities
through the infringement of their persona rights are not purely economic. For
example, the court in Brinkley v. Casablancasheld that the injury was both to

10 See Melville B. Nimmer, The Rigbt of Pubidoy, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 216 (1954)
(emphasis added). See also Madow, supra note 100, at 175-76.
" See, e.g., Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bembach, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 661,664 (N.Y. App. Div.

1977) (emphasizing the length of time the celebrity plaintiff spent developing the commercial worth
of his name); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn 1970) ("A celebrity must
be considered to have invested his years of practice and competition in a public personality which
eventually may reach marketable status.").
112 See sApra Part I.A.4.
13 Haemmerli, supra note 92, at 388.
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feelings-a dignitary interest-and a property interest."4 This outcome makes
intuitive sense. As an earlier example demonstrates, if a photographer sold the
picture of a naked Kim Basinger to a tabloid, the resulting injury would not be
merely economic. Not only would Basinger be unable to commercially exploit her
nude image, she would also suffer and most likely seek damages for the dignitary
wrong of having her unclothed figure on public display. As this example
indicates, a simple economic rationale cannot completely encapsulate all the
intricacies of the right to publicity.
Because of this utnique aspect of publicity rights, alternative intellectual
justification is needed. The personhood theory of property provides that
5
justification. The theory was first introduced by Professor Margaret J. Radin.1
Drawing heavily on the philosophies of Hegel, Radin argued that the will of
individuals is embodied in the things they possess, and the entity we know as a
person cannot exist without maintaining relationships with portions of his or her
surrounding environment." 6 Put another way, an individual's embodiment or
self-constitution is defined in terms of "things" that the person owns or
possesses. 17 Radin continues, "one may gauge the strength or significance of
someone's relationship with an object by the kind of pain that would be
occasioned by its loss.... [A]n object is closely related to one's personhood if its
' 8
loss causes pain that cannot be relieved by the object's replacement." "
The personhood justification of property helps explain the dual nature of
publicity rights. The economic-based rationales account for the monetary losses
a celebrity suffers, but the dignitary harm a celebrity endures from infringement
is better understood as an encroachment on his or her personhood. In the above
hypothetical, the harm felt by Basinger cannot be cured simply by the return of
the nude photographs because her privacy and personhood have been invaded.
Thus, while it is important to appreciate the economic rationales for publicity
rights, a complete understanding, and therefore a complete discussion of the right
to publicity, requires an appreciation for its unique and powerful personhoodbased foundations.

n1 Brinldey v. Casablancas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1012 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
ns Margaret J. Radin, Properoand Personhood,34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982).
16 Id at 977. See also Haemmerli, supra note 92, at 418. An oversimplified version of Kant's
argument states that "property is inseparably associated with one's 'personhood' because property
grows out of freedom and freedom is essential to personhood." Id
117 Radin, smpra note 115, at 958.
18 Id at 959.
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C. THE BANKRUPTCY FORUM

Returning to the realm of bankruptcy, an important question remains
unanswered. If the right to publicity is treated as an asset of the estate and sold
to the highest bidder, what does the purchaser obtain? Jacoby and Zimmerman
argue that the purchaser would obtain the right to commercially exploit that
person's name or likeness, and the celebrity would be barred from entering into
contracts to make advertisements and future marketing endorsements." 9 From
a personhood perspective, such an approach would only lead to a constant
conflict between a celebrity's dignitary interest and the economic interest in the
commercial exploitation of a famous person's persona.
It is not hard to imagine celebrities objecting to the use of their name or
likeness. In the extreme example, a third-party purchaser wants to publish risqu6
photos of a celebrity. Certainly celebrities would suffer extreme emotional
distress and experience a violation of their privacy in such a situation. More
realistically, there are any number of political, religious, or personal reasons
celebrities might wish to deny associating their name and likeness with a product.
For example, Don Newcombe, a former pitcher for the Los Angeles Dodgers and
a recovering alcoholic, brought suit against Coors Brewing Co. for an
advertisement in Sports Illustrated that included his likeness. 2 ' Newcombe, as a
recovering alcoholic and spokesperson for drug and alcohol abuse awareness
groups, alleged that the ad was defamatory since it implied his endorsement of
alcohol. 2' The court ultimately rejected Newcombe's emotional distress and
defamation claims, but the court stopped short of finding that the dignitary harm
Newcombe alleged was non-existent." This case provides a moderate example
of the dignitary harm celebrities might experience if their likeness and persona
were subject to forced sale.
Proponents of liquidation argue that dignitary interests are protected even
after forced sale of their persona rights through such mechanisms as defamation
suits or unfair competition claims under the Lanham Act."2 However, as the
Newcombe case illustrates, such remedies are often insufficient to protect the
dignitary interests of the celebrity. 4 Additionally, commentators provide no

119Jacoby & Zimmerman, spra note 10, at 1355-56.
120Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 48

U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1190 (9th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 694.
" Id at 694-95. The court dismissed the claim on the grounds that it was not libelous on its
face, i.e., the reader would not know Newcombe was a recovering alcoholic, and Newcombe did not
satisfy the statutory definition of "special damages," which were defined as damages relating to the
plaintiff's "property, business, trade, profession or occupation." Id.
123Jacoby & Zimmerman, supranote 10, at 1362-63.
124 Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 694-95.
121
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framework for how such claims would be evaluated in light of the defendant
owning the right to commercially exploit the celebrity persona. Furthermore,
such an approach would significantly limit the third-party purchaser's ability to
exploit the property they purchased. If, at the trustee's liquidation sale, a thirdparty purchases a car, the buyer is not restricted in using that car. The purchaser
of a celebrity's publicity right, by contrast, would be restricted to such uses that
are not defamatory or do not unfairly compete with the rights the debtor retains.
This supposed division of the property creates complicated and unworkable
boundaries, a trait that would be unique to this property in bankruptcy.
D. EXEMPTIONS AND PERSONHOOD

The ultimate problem that proponents of inclusion of publicity rights in the
bankruptcy estate face is the inability to perfectly sever the dignitary and
economic aspects of the property interest. Radin recognized that property exists
on two levels: "personal and fungible."' 25 No framework for understanding
publicity rights that incorporates both aspects of this unique property exists.
Critics are quick to push aside this dignitary interest dilemma by arguing that
bankruptcy law has never bothered itself by worrying about such things.' 26
However, this argument has little support in statutory law.
Frequently, state exemptions protect personhood connections in property and
exempt such property from the bankruptcy estate. In her dissertation of
personhood connections, Radin argues home ownership is toward the "personal
end of the continuum" and thus closely tied to one's personhood.' 27 State law
seems to recognize a homestead's importance in one's concept of self.'28 The
amount of a homestead exemption therefore represents a policy judgment made
by a state legislature. Some states such as Florida, whose unlimited homestead
exemption has been the target of critics who argue it favors wealthy debtors and
denies creditors maximum return, 29 recognize that the homestead exemption is
needed for an effective reorganization under bankruptcy and may also recognize
that property so uniquely tied to a debtor's personhood and self-image deserves
complete protection. This recognition would explain other property exemptions
on personal items such as wedding rings, family photographs, and family
heirlooms. 3 ' Thus, state exemption statutes are not only mechanisms for
Radin, smpra note 115, at 987.
Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 10, at 1347.
127Radin, supra note 115, at 987.
128 See supra note 36. See also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(a) (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2000).
129 See, e.g., Jacoby & Zimmerman, spra note 10, at 1363-64.
'25
126

130See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §2740(3) (2002) (granting an unlimited exemption for wedding
rings); see also TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 42.002(a)(1) (Vernon 2000).
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insuring a debtor emerges with a minimum level of assets, but also are a powerful
tool for insuring that the debtor does not endure the loss of important dignitary
interests. As legislatures and courts continue to examine the right to publicity,
and as more celebrities file bankruptcy, policy makers must ask themselves what
could be a more crushing blow to a person's dignity and sense of self than losing
the ability to govern his public image.
V. ECONOMIC AND CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS

Separate and independent of any theoretical discussion, inclusion of the right
of publicity in the bankruptcy estate poses significant economic and constitutional
dangers. Assuming the personhood justification is not an appropriate rationale
for the right to publicity and accepting the incentives and labor theory as the
proper paradigm, as most scholars have,' the forfeiture would still strip the
debtor of a property interest in future work, remove incentives to create
entertaining works, and potentially tread upon constitutional protections.
A. LOSS OF FUTURE LABOR AND CREATING NEGATIVE INCENTIVES

The bankruptcy filing is like a photograph: it creates a picture fixed in time.
All property the debtor possesses at the time of the bankruptcy petition not
subject to exemption becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. The estate is then
used to satisfy to the fullest extent the debtor's past obligations. However, after
the bankruptcy picture is taken, the debtor is left with an unencumbered fresh
start, and no creditor can use future assets to satisfy pre-bankruptcy debts.13 A
very important component of that unburdened future is the statutory protection
afforded to a debtor to retain earnings from services performed after the
commencement of the case.' Unfortunately, including the right to publicity in
the bankruptcy estate would severely infringe upon that statutory protection.
This statutory violation stems from two sources. The first is the inability of
courts and commentators to explain exactly what a purchaser would acquire from
a liquidation sale."M Is the debtor obligated to pose for future endorsements or
attend promotional events? In order to prevent purchasers from depriving

131

See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text.

132 See supra text Part I.A.2.
133

See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(6).

14 As the only proponents thus far of such an approach, Jacoby and Zimmerman do not offer

a specific proposal for selling the right to publicity. Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 10, at 1365.
At various points in their discussion, the authors instead propose several different approaches to
accommodate objections by skeptics. Id Unfortunately, Jacoby & Zimmerman do not condense
the possibilities into one optimal approach or framework. See id.
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debtors of their future work, these cannot be included. Yet until commentators
are able to explain what the purchaser is acquiring, the right to publicity can never
fit neatly into the bankruptcy estate. The second source of this dilemma is the
dynamic nature of the right to publicity. Celebrities' future actions significantly
impact the value of their persona. In this regard, the right of publicity is a
dynamic property right. A brief hypothetical illustrates this point. Suppose on
January 1, a moderately known television actor files bankruptcy. His right of
publicity is auctioned off and sold to a third party. The discharge is entered on
June 1. On October 1, the actor lands a supporting role, playing opposite the
biggest movie star in the United States. For this role, the actor gains universal
appeal and commendation, wins numerous awards, and is cast as the lead in
numerous upcoming motion pictures. He is approached by several fashion
designers and other advertisers seeking his endorsement of a product.
Meanwhile, the third-party purchaser holds the exclusive right to exploit the
actor's commercial image. This factual dilemma begs the question, what does the
third-party own?
It seems apparent from the hypothetical that by not possessing the exclusive
right to market his image, the celebrity is denied the fruits and rewards of his
future labor and destined to forfeit post-petition earnings. Even worse, such a
framework would significantly diminish the celebrity debtor's incentive to
produce new and creative works of entertainment after bankruptcy. Society
would lose the enjoyment of future works because the law failed to provide the
appropriate incentives needed to foster such development.'35
Traditional bankruptcy principles do not solve this problem. When a dispute
over the value of postpetition appreciation occurs, courts have frequently turned
to the Supreme Court's seminal decision in Segal v. Rochelle.'36 The Segal test
regards property as part of the bankruptcy estate if it is "sufficiently rooted in the
pre-bankruptcy past and so little entangled with the bankrupt's ability to make an
'
In evaluating the right of publicity, the two prongs
unencumbered fresh start."137
of the Segal test are in tension.
First, the property will be excluded from the estate if it is not sufficiently
rooted in the pre-bankruptcy past.' 38 In Segal, the Court found that a tax refund
based on a business's prior taxable years was property since the right to the
refund existed at the time of the bankruptcy filing.' 39 Problems may arise if the
135 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 99, at 11.
136 Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966) (superseded by statute as stated in In reNadler, 122 B.R.

162 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990)).
117Id at 380.
138 id
139

Id. AccordKokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 648 (1974) (holding an accrued tax refund was

property of the estate because the taxes were on prior personal earnings).
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persona rights were already commercially exploited and valuable before the
bankruptcy. If subsequent acts increase the value of the publicity rights by a
marginal amount, the previously exploited property may be so rooted in the prebankruptcy past that the future value is simply transferred to the party who
acquires the persona rights.
On the other hand, the second prong seems to allow debtors to retain their
persona rights. The second prong of Segal focuses on whether the property is
entangled with the bankrupt's ability to make a fresh start. While this standard
seems to give a court a great deal of discretion in deciding what the debtor needs
to make a fresh start, commentators have taken a more narrow reading. Tabb
argues that the fresh start goals of the Segal test are protected primarily by the
operation of § 541(a)(6). 4 ° Under that section, postpetition proceeds of estate
property will come into the estate unless they are attributable to the postpetition
services of the individual debtor.1 4 ' Thus, any individual act or service performed
by celebrities that results in an increase in the value of their persona would not be
part of the estate and would be part of the debtor's fresh start.
The most efficient and thorough way of resolving this tension is to exempt
persona rights from the bankruptcy estate. Courts and legislators can insure that
a debtor's fresh start and future labor is protected. The legal system can provide
the necessary incentives to actors and celebrities to create movies, songs, and
public works. The most efficient manner of doing so is to use state exemption
law to create an unlimited exemption in the debtor's right to commercially exploit
his or her likeness, voice, photograph, or other expressions of persona.
B. CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMAS AND WASTE

The second flaw in inclusion of the right of publicity in the bankruptcy estate
is that such forced association raises constitutional issues concerning the freedom
of association and involuntary servitude. 42 While the freedom of association
argument suffers major flaws,
forcing celebrities to submit their image and
endorsement to a product or forcing them to pose for a photograph session
appears facially unconstitutional as a violation of involuntary servitude.'" Jacoby
and Zimmerman avoid the involuntary servitude dilemma by stating purchasers
of the right of publicity would never expect that they could require a celebrity to

TABB, supra note 14, at 280.
11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(6).
142 Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 10, at 1363 (stating the freedom of association argument
140
141

lacks development).
14 See id. at 1363 n.202.
144 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII,

§ 1.
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travel and promote a particular product. 145 This conclusory statement, however,
is insufficient to avoid the practical quandary.
First,Jacoby and Zimmerman fail to explain how the purchaser would be able
to exploit the celebrity's persona without requiring the personality to endorse the
product in the form of future statements or actions.'46 Furthermore, assuming
for argument's sake that the right to commercially exploit a celebrity's persona is
limited only to items such as pictures, likeness, or recordings that were made
before the bankruptcy, that would limit the creative ability of the celebrity as well
as the economic value of the item purchased. The proponents of liquidation
concede that celebrities would be barred from entering into contracts to make
advertisements or participate in future marketing endorsements, as doing so
would put themselves into competition with the purchaser rendering the celebrity
"an infringer of her own publicity right."' 47 The end product of this framework
would be that the purchaser of the publicity right would retain past images,
performances, and other embodiments of personal rights, and neither the
celebrity nor the property owner would be able to commercially exploit future
publicity rights. This arrangement would inevitably lead to a waste of future work
and diminish any incentive for the celebrity to create future work.
VI. PROPOSAL
Mindful of the policy interests served by the U.S. bankruptcy system and the
growing list of celebrity filers, reform is needed to protect celebrities' privacy and
future earning capacity. Each state should adopt a special exemption excluding
a celebrity's persona rights from the bankruptcy estate. These state exemption
statutes should completely exempt from bankruptcy proceedings any property
right or interest in a celebrity's name, likeness, voice, or photograph. Such
statutes should be modeled after Illinois's statute, which exempts any property
interest in a celebrity's persona from levy, attachment, or security interest."
Two aspects of the right to publicity demand that a celebrity retain full rights
to the commercial exploitation of his or her persona. First, the right to publicity
is inextricably linked to a celebrity's personhood and dignitary interests. Rather
than an assurance that the debtor retains a minimal level of assets, such an
exemption is an important protection to the debtor's personhood. Second, the
& Zimmerman, supra note 10, at 1351.
Id. at 1361-63.
141Id. at 1355-56.
148 765 ILL. CoMP. STAT.ANN. 1075/15 (West 2001). This exemption, however, does not
prevent a creditor from levying, attaching or taking a security interest in any proceeds the celebrity
derives from the exercise of those rights. See id Allowing the creditors to levy on the revenue
stream from such rights presupposes that the insolvent celebrity has not filed for bankruptcy.
'4sJacoby
'
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ability to commercially exploit the right of publicity is a critical and significant
source of income for the debtor following the debtor's discharge.
VII. CONCLUSION

The increase in celebrity bankruptcy filings has not gone unnoticed. Citing the
bankruptcy of Kim Basinger, Senator Charles Grassley of Iowa introduced
legislation in 2001 to change bankruptcy laws to promote the use of Chapter 13
as opposed to Chapter 7.149 As the number of celebrities who file bankruptcy
grows, the call by members of the political system will only strengthen. "There
are people that have the ability.... They're not paying their bills," said Senator
Grassley.5i' Most of the American populace would agree that the bankruptcy
system should not be used by debtors to escape obligations rightfully incurred.
In the case of celebrity debtors, there is a natural skepticism to their bankruptcy
filings. In an age where movie stars make millions of dollars for each movie and
thousands for a single photo shoot, it is hard to understand how celebrities can
end up bankrupt and seeking forgiveness for their debts. But as the list of famous
bankruptcies grows, the law should not let that skepticism become an overzealous
call to force repayment at all costs.
The American bankruptcy system is a system designed to balance the interests
of the debtors seeking a reprieve from their debt-ridden past with the interests of
creditors seeking to realize a return on their legitimate investment. Celebrity
debtors often have assets significantly more valuable than the traditional debtor.
One asset celebrity debtors possess that is unique to their celebrity status is the
right to publicity. Recently, scholars have suggested that a celebrity's persona
rights provide a potentially significant source of income that can be used by the
bankruptcy courts to satisfy antecedent debts.15'
While the idea has initial appeal, such a treatment of persona rights would
inflict two distinct harms upon the celebrity debtor. First, the right to publicity,
while undeniably a form of property, has never broken free of its roots in the
right to privacy. If the personhood theory of property is the accepted paradigm,
there are few pieces of property with such strong personhood ties as a person's
name, likeness, or image. As such, to force actors or celebrities to sacrifice the
right to market their face and likeness may operate as a significant infringement
on a celebrity debtor's privacy and dignitary interests.

149

PassingtbeBillonBankruptyhttp://cnnstudentnews.cnn.com/201/fyi/news/04/24/young.

debt/ (Apr. 24, 2001).
150 Id
151 See, e.g., Jacoby & Zimmerman, supra note 10.
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Second, even assuming the right of publicity is a property interest free from
personhood attachments, forced sale of the celebrity's persona rights would still
violate basic bankruptcy principles including the right against forfeiture of future
labor and wages. Stripping celebrities of the right to commercially exploit their
likeness would remove critical incentives for celebrities to create new works of
entertainment value to the American people. Such an approach also raises
questions of a constitutional dimension and possible involuntary servitude
problems.
So who owns Kim Basinger and other celebrity debtors? Unfortunately, the
courts have not answered that question. However, if a creditor can regulate the
actions of celebrity debtors including their ability to have children and select how
and when to work, what, if anything, is off limits to creditors? The proponents
of including the right to publicity in the bankruptcy estate have not proposed a
working framework for such a treatment that will preserve the important
economic and dignitary interests of the debtor. In order to prevent these pitfalls,
states should individually adopt laws that exempt the right to commercially exploit
a person's name, likeness, voice, or other recognized persona rights from the
bankruptcy estate. Modeling the law after the Illinois statute that currently
prevents creditors from attaching, levying, or subjecting persona rights to a
security interest would be ideal. This approach would provide a powerful
protection for celebrity debtors' privacy rights and foster the continued growth
of the intellectual property in American jurisprudence.
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